The dismantling of legal barriers to the integration of nancial services is one of the recent, major developments in the banking industry. This led to an expansion of the variety of nancial intermediaries and types of transactions. However, this trend may alter banks' risk-taking incentives and may affect overall banking sector stability. This paper analyzes how banks' divergent strategies toward specialization and diversi cation of nancial activities affect their ability to shelter from adverse economic conditions. To this end, market-based measures of banks' extreme systematic risk are generated, using techniques developed for extreme value analysis. Extreme systematic risk captures the probability of a sharp decline in a bank's stock price conditional on a crash in a market index. Subsequently, the impact of (the correlation between) interest and non-interest income (and its components) on this risk measure is assessed. The estimation results reveal that the heterogeneity in extreme bank risk can partially be attributed to differences in banks' reliance on non-traditional banking activities.
Introduction
In the last thirty years, nancial systems in the world have undergone considerable changes. One of the major developments in recent years in the banking industry has been the dismantling of the legal barriers to the integration of distinct nancial services and the subsequent emergence of nancial conglomerates.
In Europe the Second banking Directive of 1989 allowed banks to combine banking, insurance and other nancial services under a single corporate umbrella. Similar deregulatory initiatives took place in the US, by means of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. These deregulations resulted in an expansion in the variety of activities and nancial transactions that banks engaged in.
Most of the existing research addressing the issue of the optimal scope of nancial corporations takes an industrial organization approach (in accordance with the literature on non-nancial corporations) and analyzes whether nancial conglomerates create or destroy value (see e.g. Laeven and Levine, 2007; Schmid and Walter, 2007) . However, while diversi cation of activities may create an enormous impact on rms' valuations, for instance in terms of transaction costs or access to capital; for nancial corporations the risk aspect is at least as important (if not more). Accordingly researchers started studying whether functional diversi cation reduces bank risk, by investigating the optimal scope of nancial corporations from a portfolio perspective (see e.g. Baele et al., 2007; Stiroh, 2006) . We contribute to the empirical literature on the optimal scope of nancial corporations by addressing a third perspective, that of nancial stability. Prudential supervisors are concerned with extreme bank risk, which may threaten banking system stability. These banking sector supervisors and central banks monitor the entire banking system (of a certain country/region) and can be viewed as holders of a portfolio of banks. Their main interest is in maintaining and protecting the value of their portfolio in times of market stress. That is, regulators are especially interested in the frequency and magnitude of extreme shocks to the system, which threaten the smooth functioning (and ultimately the continuity) of banks. However, not all banks need to contribute equally to the risk pro le of the supervisor's portfolio and the stability of the banking system. Differences in risk may stem from diversity in the organizational design of banking rms. In this paper, we focus on how divergent strategies toward specialization and diversi cation of nancial activities affect the ability of banks to shelter from adverse economic conditions. A crucial input in the analysis is our measure of extreme bank risk during adverse economic conditions. We measure banking system stability and the extreme systematic risk pro le of listed European banks over different time periods using recently developed techniques (Hartmann et al., 2006 and Straetmans et al., 2008) . More precisely, we estimate the probability of crashes in bank stocks, conditional on crashes of a market factor (in casu, a European stock market index). The choice of this measure is determined by two empirical stylized facts on banking panics. First, historically, banking panics occurred when depositors initiated a bank run. Fortunately, true banking panics and associated bank runs by depositors appear to be (almost) history in developed countries (as a result of the development of central banks and deposit insurance schemes). Nevertheless, banks still need to be monitored carefully.
In more recent periods, they face a stronger disciplining role by stock market participants. As a consequence, equity and bond market signals are good leading indicators of bank fragility (Gropp et al., 2006) . Second, Gorton (1988) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) document that most banking panics have been related to macroeconomic uctuations rather than to prevalent contagion or 'mass hysteria'. Therefore, to capture banking system stability, we measure banks' extreme systematic risk exposures.
Our research contributes to the banking literature in the following fashion. First, by measuring the extreme risk pro le for all listed European banks over different time periods we document the presence of substantial cross-sectional heterogeneity and time variation in the co-crash probabilities of European banks. Second, we are able to attribute a substantial degree of this heterogeneity to bank-speci c characteristics. More speci cally, we contribute to the debate on the optimal functional scope of ( nancial) rms by analyzing the impact of revenue diversity on banks' extreme risk exposures. Third, we show that the focus on extreme bank risk and banking system stability provides insights supplementary to the existing evidence on banks' riskiness in normal economic conditions. While evidence on the relationships between macro-economic conditions, regulatory variables and banking crises is more widespread, this paper may help regulators in understanding why some banks are better able to shelter from the storm.
Our results establish that the shift to non-traditional banking activities, which generate commission, trading and other non-interest income, increases banks' co-crash probabilities and thus reduces banking system stability. Interest income is less risky than all other revenue streams. The estimation results reveal that other indicators of bank specialization in traditional intermediation corroborate the nding that traditional banking activities result in lower extreme systematic risk. Banks with a higher interest margin or higher loans-to-asset ratio are perceived to be less affected by extreme market shocks since higher values of these ratios reduce banks' tail betas. Hence, we can conclude that banks that profitably focus on lending activities are less prone to extreme systematic risk than diversi ed banks. This questions the usefulness of nancial conglomeration as a risk diversi cation device, at least in times of stock market turmoil. However, we also document that the extent to which shocks to the various income shares are correlated matters for overall and extreme bank risk. 3 This exclusive focus on the banking sector is warranted. Not only is the banking sector a particularly important sector for the stability of the nancial system (due to their interrelatedness with other types of nancial intermediaries), banks still occupy a crucial spot in every economy. Disruptions in the smooth functioning of the banking industry tend to exacerbate overall uctuations in output. Consequently, banking crises are associated with signi cant output losses. Hence, preserving banking sector stability is of utmost importance and the priority task of banking supervisors. In addition, the third pillar of the Basel II encourages market participants, rather than regulators, to contribute to the assessment of the overall risk position of the bank. From this perspective, a more complete and coherent disclosure of the different revenue streams may further facilitate a better understanding of the risk exposures of different institutions. Finally, since large banks are more exposed to European-wide shocks, their prudential supervision needs to take that feature into account. In Europe, increasing banking sector integration initiated by directives that led to the single market for nancial services further complicates the tasks of national and supranational supervisors. This will be even more the case when banks further increase their cross-border activities. For the locally operating banks, supervision at the country level should suf ce to assess the implications of their risk pro le.
The following section reviews relevant literature on the risk-taking incentives of nancial conglomerates and the impact of revenue diversity on bank risk. In Section 3, we discuss the sample composition.
The next section describes the methodology to measure banks' co-crash probabilities and presents the estimates of banks' tail-. The subsequent section, Section 5, is divided into three subsections. The rst subsection introduces the results for the drivers of heterogeneity in extreme bank risk. In a panel set-up, we relate the co-crash probabilities to different types of nancial revenues and other bank-speci c control variables. The second subsection deals with re nements on the panel data set-up and robustness of the baseline regression. We show that the results are not driven by reverse causality or particular events (such as M&As, IPOs, delistings or banking crises) that may create a sample selection bias. Subsection 5.3. documents that the information content of the tail beta differs signi cantly from the information contained in central dependence measures (such as the traditional beta or the correlation between bank stock returns and market returns). Section 6 concludes with policy implications. (Stiroh, 2006) arrive at a similar conclusion. For a sample of US banks over the period 1997-2004, no signi cant link between non-interest income exposure and average returns across banks can be established. On the other hand, the volatility of market returns is signi cantly and positively affected by the reliance on non-interest income.
European banks that have moved into non-interest income activities present a higher level of risk than banks which mainly perform traditional intermediation activities (Mercieca et al., 2007) . Moreover, risk is mainly positively correlated with the share of fee-based activities but not with trading activities (Lepetit et al., 2008) . Recent research linking the effect of diversi cation on market-based measures of performance and riskiness (and the risk/return trade-off) nds that banks with a higher share of noninterest income in total income are perceived to perform better in the long run (Baele et al., 2007) .
However, this better performance is offset by higher systematic risk. Diversi cation of revenue streams 1 Notwithstanding the fact that the scope for functional diversi cation has been deregulated earlier and more completely in Europe, most of the empirical evidence is based on US data. To sum up, most of the available evidence identi es relationships between functional diversi cation and bank risk in normal economic conditions. However, it is not so clear how diversi ed nancial institutions will behave in adverse economic situations and what the overall impact of revenue diversication on banking sector stability will be in these circumstances. The remainder of this paper will focus exclusively on this particular aspect.
The sample
Since the purpose of the analysis is to investigate how diversity in bank revenue affects European banks' extreme systematic risk, we employ both accounting data and stock price information. We combine information extracted from two data sources. For balance sheet and income statement data, we rely on the Bankscope database, which provides comparable information across countries. Bankscope does not provide stock price information on a daily basis; hence we use Datastream to obtain information on daily stock returns and market capitalization. Matching of both datasets is done based on the ISINidenti er (an identi cation system similar to the CUSIP number in the US and Canada) for the listed banks. Unfortunately, Bankscope does not provide the ISIN-number for delisted banks. For the delisted banks, the information from the two datasets is matched using information on some basic accounting data (e.g. total assets, equity,... which are also provided by Datastream). In a similar fashion, we veri ed the matching of the listed banks. We perform a number of selection criteria. First, we only include banks for which we can obtain at least 6 consecutive years of accounting and stock market information. This restriction is imposed because we use extreme value analysis to model extreme bank risk. In extreme value analysis, large samples are needed since only a fraction of the information is used in the estimations. 6 consecutive years of daily stock prices yield at least 1500 observations, a sample size that is feasible to apply extreme value analysis, though close to the lower bound 2 of the existing applications in nance. Second, following common practice in the nance literature, we impose a liquidity criterion on the stock returns.
The rationale is that infrequently traded stocks may not absorb information accurately. We measure liquidity by the number of daily returns that are zero. However, in this analysis we can be rather mild on the imposed liquidity criterion. We only disregard stock if more than 60% of the daily returns are zero returns. Hence, we assume that although these bank stocks are very illiquid, their non-zero returns most likely re ect important, extreme events that are informative for our purposes. Moreover, their zero returns will not affect our estimates of extreme risk, since the tail of the distribution will still contain the extreme movements in banks' stock prices.
Due to delisting, IPOs and mergers and acquisitions, our dataset is unbalanced. Some banks are only listed for 6 years whereas others have been operational and listed for a longer period. Comparing banks' behavior and risk pro le is only sensible if each bank's characteristics are measured over the same time interval. One possibility is to consider only those banks that are active (and listed) over the entire period. However, in this case, useful information on the other banks is neglected and may induce a selection bias. We opt for a different approach. We measure banks' extreme systematic risk exposures over moving windows of 6 years. The rst period covers the years 1992-1997. In each subsequent subsample, we drop the observations of the initial sample year and add a more recent year of data.
Since the sample period spans 13 years, we obtain 8 rolling subsamples of 6 years. Hence, at each point in time, we can meaningfully compare the cross-sectional differences in banks' risk pro le. In general, the composition of the bank set will be different in each subperiod. 2 We also perform the analysis on moving subsample of 8 years. The results are very similar.
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4 A stock market-based measure of bank stability In mathematical terms, we are interested in the following expression: P (X > x j Y > y). This expression capture the conditional probability that the return on one asset, X, exceeds a certain threshold x conditional on observing that the return on another asset, Y , exceeds y. This conditional probability re ects the dependence between two return series X and Y . We adopt the convention to take the negative of the return when outlining the methodology. x and y are thresholds in the tail of the distributions, such that they correspond with situations of large losses. In general, x and y may differ across stocks (especially in our analysis where Y is the return on a portfolio and X is the return on a single stock), but we impose that they correspond to outcomes that are equally (un)likely to occur. That is, the unconditional probability that an asset crashes equals
where Q x and Q y are quantiles.
The conditional co-crash probability can be rewritten as:
In general, X and Y can be the returns generated by any kind of asset. However, if the conditioning 8 asset Y is a broad market portfolio, the conditional probability can be seen as a tail extension of a regression based obtained in classical asset pricing models. The resulting co-crash probabilities provide an indication of systematic risk during crisis periods. Hence, an asset's co-crash probability with the market, P (X > Q x (p) j Y > Q y (p)), will be labelled tail- (Straetmans et al., 2008) .
To obtain the tail-, we only need an estimate of the joint probability in the numerator. The denominator is determined by p. We implement the approach proposed by Ledford and Tawn (1996) . This approach is semi-parametric and allows both for asymptotic dependence and asymptotic independence 3 .
Hence, we can avoid making (wrong) distributional assumptions on the asset returns. This approach has The joint probability is determined by the dependence between the two assets and their marginal distributions. In order to extract information on the (tail) dependence, we want to eliminate the impact of the different marginal distributions. Therefore, we transform the original return series X and Y to series with a common marginal distribution. If one transforms the different return series to ones with a common marginal distribution, the impact of marginals on the joint tail probabilities is eliminated. This means that differences in the conditional crash probabilities of banks are purely due to differences in the tail dependency of extreme returns. The empirical counterpart of transforming the stock returns to unit Pareto marginals 4 is based on the following equation:
where i = 1; :::; n and R Xi is the rank order statistic of return X i . Since e X i and e Y i have the same marginal distribution, it follows that the quantiles Q e x (p) and Q e y (p) now equal q = 1=p.
The transformation of the return series affects the numerator of the co-crash probability as follows:
Hence, the transformation to unit Pareto marginals reduces the estimation of the multivariate probability to a univariate set-up. The univariate exceedance probability of the minimum series of the two stock returns, Z = min( e X; e Y ), can now be estimated using techniques that are standard in univariate extreme value analysis 5 . The only assumption that has to be made is that the minimum series 3 Asymptotic dependence means that the conditional tail probability de ned on (X; Y ) does not vanish in the bivariate tail.
With asymptotic independence, the co-exceedance probability decreases as we move further into the bivariate tail. 4 Other transformations are also feasible. Poon et al. (2004) transform the return series to unit Fréchet marginals. 5 In the remainder of this section, we still use Z to refer to the return series. In our speci c case, Z is the series created by taking the minimum of e X and e Y . Note, however, that Z may also be the return series of a single (untransformed) stock if one wants to model unconditional tail risk. Z = min( e X; e Y ) also exhibits fat tails.
Univariate tail probabilities for fat-tailed random variables can be estimated by using the semiparametric probability estimator from De Haan et al. (1994) :
Z n m;n is the "tail cut-off point", which equals the (n m) th ascending order statistic, in a sample of size n, of the newly created minimum series Z. The advantage of this estimator is that one can extend the crash levels outside the domain of the observed, realized returns. Note that the tail probability estimator is conditional upon the tail index and a choice of the number of tail observations used, m. This tail index captures the decay in the probability with which ever more extreme events occur (jointly). A relatively high tail index corresponds with a relatively low probability of extreme events.
The tail index is traditionally estimated using the Hill estimator (1975):
In this equation, Z n j;n denotes the (n j)-th ascending order statistic from the return series where b is stable (this procedure is usually referred to as the Hill plot method). Next to being arbitrary, this is dif cult to implement if one considers many stock returns. A second option is to determine the optimal sample fraction, m, using a double bootstrap procedure (Danielsson et al., 2001 ). However, this procedure requires, in general, samples that are longer than the one we observe (and it requires heavy computing power).
We apply a third method, which directly estimates a modi ed Hill estimator that corrects for the Therefore, after estimating the optimal b , we perform an automated grid search to nd a stable region in the Hill plot that is as close as possible to the optimal tail index. m is then taken as the midpoint from this region.
Combining equations (1), (4) and (5) allows computing the extreme systematic risk measure, tail-:
We will estimate this tail-for listed European banks observed over multiple time periods to get an indication of the time evolution and the cross-sectional dispersion in bank's extreme risk sensitivity.
Measuring extreme systematic risk: results
We are interested in assessing the extent to which individual banks are exposed to an aggregate shock, as captured by an extreme downturn of the market risk factor. The market risk factor is captured by a broad European stock market index. For each bank stock (as well as the market factor), we calculated daily returns as the percentage changes in the return index. All series are expressed in local currency to prevent distortion by exchange rate uctuations.
Before showing the estimated co-crash probabilities, we provide insight in the severity of the events that we are modelling. That is, we rst report the unconditional Value-at-Risk levels or quantiles associated with a certain probability p. The lower the probability, the more extreme are the situations we consider. We set the crash probability level p at 0:04%. Given that we are using daily data, a probability of 0:04% corresponds to a situation that occurs on average once every 10 years (= (250 p) 1 ).
Doing so, we exploit one of the main bene ts of modelling the entire tail of the (joint) distribution. We are looking at events that happen less frequently than the observed sample length. We summarize the ndings on the unconditional Value-at-Risk levels in Table 1 . In order to get these crash magnitudes, we rst estimate the tail index for each individual series using the modi ed Hill estimator, Eq. (5) (Z is now a simple return series). The magnitude of the daily loss for a given probability level can then beobtained using the inverse of Eq. (4), that is b q = Z n m;n m p n 1 b . Hence, lower probability events will cause an increase in the absolute value of the crash level, whereas events that occur more frequently (at least in terms of extreme value analysis) will lead to lower crash magnitudes. Table 1 with the largest extreme market risk in the sample. Note that in all but one period, the estimated daily crash is worse than the observed minimal daily return. This is due to looking at events that are less frequent than the moving window of 6 years.
Panel B contains information on the time evolution as well as the cross-sectional dispersion in the daily losses of European bank stock returns that happen with a probability of 0:04%. The rows in panel B provide information on the variation in the Value-at-Risk across banks at each time span we consider.
We report several percentiles as well as the mean and the standard deviation. The last row contains the number of banks we observe in that particular period. Again, we report the results in eight columns, one for each moving time frame of 6 years over the period 1992-2004. The median crash magnitude of the bank stocks exhibits a similar time pattern as the VaR of the European stock market index. A rst peak is reached over the period 1993-1998. In this period, the daily loss in market value associated with a 0:04% probability event exceeded 11:7% for half of the banks in the sample. In ve of the eight periods under consideration, the median daily VaR was also lower or equal to 11%. The mean VaR is almost always larger (in absolute value) than the median VaR and the gap between the two is higher in the initial sample years. Similar information can be extracted from the standard deviation. The standard deviation is indicative for the cross-sectional dispersion. The standard deviation has decreased from values around 0:08 to less than 0:04. This is caused both by a decrease in the crash magnitude of the riskiest banks and an increase in the riskiness of the (unconditionally) safest banks. 12
Panel C of Table 1 is constructed in a similar fashion as panel B and presents the expected shortfall.
The expected shortfall is the average amount that is lost in a one-day period, assuming that the loss is lower than the 0:04 th percentile of the return distribution. The median expected shortfall uctuates around daily losses of 15%, but there are large differences across banks.
The comparison of the estimated VaR (and the expected shortfall) of the European index (reported in panel A) and the mean (or median) crash level (expected shortfall) of the bank stock returns, shows that most bank stocks have a higher downside risk potential than the European index. This need not be surprising, since we are comparing losses on a single asset with losses on a broad portfolio. The mean daily crash level is almost twice the VaR of the European index. When looking at the percentiles over the different time periods, we observe that, in almost all time periods, 90% of the banks may fear a larger drop (expected shortfall) in its stock price than the equally unlikely crash (expected shortfall) in the stock market. In the remainder of the paper, we investigate the properties and drivers of co-crash probabilities between bank stock returns and market returns. In general, we will be interested in events that are as severe as the value-at-risk and expected shortfall gures reported in Table 1 . The different lines in Table 2 provide an indication of the cross-sectional dispersion in the extreme systematic risk of the listed European banks. For each subsample, we report various percentiles, the mean and the standard deviation. The reported values are percentages. Hence, the mean of the European banks' tail-in the rst period indicates that there is a 9:02% probability that a European bank's stock price will crash, given that the market as a whole crashes. To put it differently, given that there is a large downturn in the market index, on average one out of 11 banks will experience an equally unlikely extreme stock price decline on that day. Recall that the level of the crashes need not be the same for the bank stock return and the conditioning asset (the European index). We rather look at crashes that have a similar probability of occurrence (set at 0:04%). In order to get some intuition in this number, it is interesting to relate this conditional probability to the results reported in Table 1 . Given that there is a market correction in the European index of 4:6%, there is a 9% probability that the European banks will be confronted with an average fall in their share price of 11:6%.
The rst and last column reveal that extreme systematic risk is quite similar in both subsamples. and the level uctuate largely. The mean tail-almost doubles in the second subperiod. In three of the 8 subperiods, the co-crash probability exceeds 16%. Moreover, Table 1 shows that in these three periods, the unconditional VaR was also higher. Hence, not only is the co-crash probability larger, the magnitude of the crash would be more severe as well. In the other periods, the mean value of banks' extreme systematic risk approximates 10% or more. In each subsample, there is a lot of cross-sectional heterogeneity. The inter-quartile range (the difference between the 25th and 75th percentile) uctuates over time but is always larger than 13%. In some subperiods, the range is even 20%. Furthermore, the mean tail beta exceeds the median at each point in time. This indicates that the distribution of the tail betas is skewed. It seems that many banks have low probabilities and are thus only moderately vulnerable to aggregated shocks. In fact, in each period, some banks have a tail-(with respect to a broad European index) below 0:04%, which is the unconditional crash probability. This means that these bank stocks crash independently of the stock market. Finally, Hartmann et al. (2006) report a mean tail-of 19:4% for the 25 largest Euro-area banks. This is substantially higher than the mean tail-we obtain in each subperiod. This is already a rst indication that larger banks will have higher co-crash probabilities.
The estimated co-crash probabilities provide insights in the dependence of events that happen with a certain probability p. In this section and in the remainder of the paper, we model very extreme events that happen with a probability of 0:04%. Given that we are using daily data, a probability of 0:04% corresponds to a situation that occurs on average once every 10 years. The probability of the event obviously affects the severity. More likely events are associated with less severe crashes. How does the level of p affect the tail-? This depends on the estimated tail dependence coef cient (the tail index of the joint tail). Asymptotic dependence ( = 1) implies that the conditional tail probability converges to a non-zero constant. However, asymptotic independence ( > 1) results in vanishing co-crash probabilities in the joint tail. In our sample, both asymptotic dependence and independence are present. Hence, for the latter, the tail-will be larger for less extreme events. For example, setting the crash probability at p=0:001, a level corresponding to the Basel II guidelines, results in less severe events but higher co-crash probabilities. In the remainder of the paper, we relate co-crash probabilities to bank-speci c characteristics. We x p at 0:04%. Nevertheless, we also experimented with probabilities in the range of [0:0001; 0:04], resulting in events that happen as infrequently as once every 40 years to yearly events.
All reported results with respect to the determinants of tail risk are similar.
14 5 The impact of revenue diversi cation on banking system stability Table 2 reveals that the tail-s can be quite different across banks and over time. This observation is of interest to bank supervisors who care about overall banking sector stability. However, next to knowing the evolution as well as the dispersion, it is even more interesting to get insight into the potential drivers of banking system stability. The drivers of cross-sectional heterogeneity in conditional crash probabilities are analyzed by relating the latter to bank-speci c variables. We have to take into account that the dependent variable is a probability. In such a case, the model E(T AIL jX ) = X does not provide the best description of E(T AIL jX ). Since the observations are constrained within the unit interval, [0; 1], the effect of X on T AIL cannot be constant over the range of X. Moreover, the predicted values from an OLS regression can never be guaranteed to be bound in the unit interval. In order to obtain that the tted values after a comparative static analysis also result in probabilities, we need to employ a generalized linear model (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996; Kieschnick and McCullough, 2003) ,
where g(:) is a link function such that g(X ) is constrained within the unit interval. A natural candidate for the link function is the logistic transformation, g(X ) = exp(X ) 1+exp(X ) , also labelled the log odds ratio 6 . The independent variables, X, are averages over a six-year interval to match the time interval over which the dependent variable is estimated. We apply robust regression techniques 7 to control for outliers in the dataset. Moreover, in each regression, we include time dummies as well as country xed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity 8 in a given period or at the country level. Furthermore, 6 Next to the logistic transformation, we also consider other appropriate transformations such as the probit and the (complementary) log-log link functions. The results are largely unaffected. All speci cations yield a similar t and statistical tests cannot discriminate in favour of a speci c link function. We follow common practice and opt for the logistic link function. This link function is used most frequently when explaining fractional response variables. 7 We employ an iteratively reweighted least squares method. In the initial iterations, Huber (1981) weights are used. In a second set of iterations biweights are employed. This combination of weighting schemes optimally combines the merits of both methods. They are: dealing with extreme outliers and fast convergence. 8 We could also interact the time and country dummy to absorbs the entire impact of variables that equally affect all banks in a country in a given period. These variables could be: the macro-economic environment, the regulatory framework, the corporate default rate. However, some of these variables (especially regarding the regulatory framework) are not available over the period 1992-2004. Neglecting them may create an omitted variable bias. Interacting both dummy variables does not affect the coef cients of interest (or their signi cance).
We did not include bank-speci c xed effects, which correspond to de-meaning the variables at the bank level. However, low variability in the de-meaned values of the independent variables makes it more dif cult (if not impossible) to estimate the the pooling of cross-sectional and time-series data induces that multiple observations on a given bank are not independent. Therefore, a robust estimation method that controls for groupwise heteroscedasticity is used. We cluster the standard errors at the country level 9 . Finally, for many banks, we obtain observations for several, but not all, subperiods, which result in an unbalanced panel.
We are primarily interested in knowing how different nancial activities affect banking system stability. Since the Second Banking Directive of 1989, banks are allowed to operate broad charters by diversifying functionally. Diversi ed banks provide a broad array of nancial services, from granting loans, underwriting and distributing securities and insurance policies, managing mutual funds and so on.
Unfortunately, detailed data on banks' exposure to each of the aforementioned activities is in general not available. However, a pragmatic de nition of functional diversi cation is used. More speci cally,
we will focus our analysis on the differential impact that different revenue sources may have on banks' extreme systematic risk exposures. Total operating income is divided into four revenue classes. They are: net interest income, net commission and fee income, net trading income and net other operating income. These sources of non-interest income capture all income from non-traditional intermediation.
Moreover, this publicly available information is the basis for analysts and investors to assess the longterm performance potential and risk pro le of a bank.
The baseline regression is speci ed as follows:
coef cients and establish signi cant relationships. If the variance is low, these regressions may contain very little information about the parameters of interest, even if the cross-sectional variation is large (Arellano, 2003) . 9 The panel data at hand have three dimensions. This may result in residuals that are correlated across observations, which From this, we conclude that clustering the standard errors in the country dimension is quite important.
We distinguish banks based on their observed revenue mix. Each type of revenue is expressed as a share of total operating income. As a result, the shares of net interest income, net commission and fee income, net trading income and net other operating income sum to one. Therefore, the share of net interest income is left out of the regression equation. Hence, a signi cant coef cient on any other share (8)). Hence, we include six correlation measures that capture whether a given bank's shocks to one type of income are typically accompanied by similar shocks to another type of income.
Next to investigating the impact of revenue diversity, we also include a number of other bank-speci c characteristics, e X. Summary statistics on the accounting variables are reported in Table 3 . The control variables capture strategic choices made by bank managers that may affect a bank's risk pro le. The capital buffer measure is included to incorporate the possibility that better capitalized institutions may be less susceptible to market-wide events. We also take into account differences in bank ef ciency by including the cost-to-income ratio. Finally, bank size and bank pro tability are also included. We include (the log of) bank size to allow for the possibility that larger banks may be more prone to marketwide events. Bank pro tability is included to control for the risk-return trade-off. Both measures are to a large extent outcomes of strategy choices made by banks and are hence highly correlated with the other control variables, and, more important, with the measures of functional diversi cation. Therefore, we orthogonalize them with respect to all other variables to derive the pure effects that size and pro ts have 10 . As a result, the coef cients on the other variables capture the full effect on banks' tail-.
The next subsection introduces the estimation results of the general speci cation. In the subsequent subsection, we verify the appropriateness of the baseline equation (and its implications) from a method- 10 The pro tability measure is regressed on all independent variables, except size. The residuals of this regression are used as a measure of excess pro ts above what is driven by banks' operational choices and are by de nition orthogonal to these bankspeci c variables. The natural logarithm of total assets is regressed on all independent variables including return on equity. The idea is to decompose bank size in an organic growth component (as a result of strategic choice) and a historical size component, the residual.
ological and an economic point of view. In the last subsection, we explore how the information content of tail-betas differs from that of central dependence measures.
The relationship between revenue diversity and banking system stability
The results 11 shown in column 1 of Table 4 re ect the relationships between various bank-speci c variables and banks' tail beta measure. From Table 4 , it can be seen that interest income is less risky than all other revenue streams. This can be inferred from the observation that the coef cients of all other revenue shares are positive. This means that the alternative revenue streams have a bigger impact on banks' extreme risk measures than that originating from traditional intermediation activities. Put differently, the co-crash probability or tail beta of a diversi ed bank is higher than the tail beta of a bank specialized in interest-generating activities. The coef cient on the share of trading income is the largest of the non-traditional revenue sources. However, the impact of the alternative revenue shares does not differ signi cantly from one another. The estimation results reveal that other indicators of bank specialization in traditional intermediation corroborate the nding that traditional banking activities result in lower extreme systematic risk. Hence, we can conclude that banks that pro tably focus on lending activities are less prone to extreme systematic risk than diversi ed banks 12 .
The diversi cation measures do not enter the equation signi cantly. Apparently, having a more equally-balanced portfolio of revenue streams (either between interest and non-interest income or within non-interest income revenue) seems not to reduce or increase a bank's extreme systematic risk exposure.
On the other hand, the extent to which the growth rates of the various revenue streams are correlated does play an important role. The coef cients are positive, as portfolio theory predicts. Imperfectly correlated revenue streams should reduce bank risk. For three out of the six correlation measures, the coef cients are highly signi cant. For two others, the p-value is around 15%. A low correlation between shocks to interest income and commission income reduces banks' tail-signi cantly. Furthermore, a low correlation between shocks of any of the non-interest income types also contributes positively to 11 The baseline results are obtained for a restricted sample of commercial banks and bank holding companies. We impose two restrictions on the sample used in the baseline. First, we eliminated non-diversi ed/specialized banks from the sample. That is, we only include banks with an interest income share between 10% and 90%. Furthermore, we also eliminate fast-growing banks.
For these banks, the correlation between each pair of growth rates of the different revenue types may be biased and overstate the true degree of revenue correlation. In the robustness section, we document that these restrictions have little impact on the baseline results. 12 This conclusion is con rmed when including measures of market power and specialization in traditional banking markets in the regression. Banks with a higher interest margin or a higher loans-to-asset ratio are perceived to be less affected by extreme market shocks since higher values of these ratios reduce banks' tail betas. However, these variables are strongly correlated with the revenue shares, which affect both the magnitude and the precision of the estimated coef cients. Therefore we do not include them in the baseline speci cation.
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overall banking system stability. These results imply that even though banks may have equal revenue shares, their risk pro le may be substantially different depending on the correlation between the revenue types.
The control variables also reveal interesting relationships. Size is by far the most signi cant driver of banks' tail betas. Being large makes you more connected to extreme market movements. Larger banks are exposed to many sectors in many countries and are hence more tied to European-wide shocks.
Smaller banks are more tied to crashes in a local stock market index since they are predominantly active in their home country. The capital-to-asset ratio exhibits the expected sign and is signi cant. A larger capital buffer decreases a bank's exposure to extreme market shocks. Banks that generate high pro ts ('in excess of their fundamentals') are much riskier. This mirrors the common risk-return trade-off. The causality in this relationship may, however, run in the other direction. Banks may gamble and increase their exposure to risky activities that may yield higher pro ts. A similar critique may hold for other relationships as well.
Another variable that may suffer from reverse causality is the equity-to-asset ratio if banks' capital buffers are eroded from unexpected losses due to the more riskier income activity. Some of the relationships may be plagued by endogeneity. That is, the relationships could occur if riskier banks engage in non-traditional banking activities, rather than the reverse. Finally, given that the risk measure is based on stock market values, there might be a spurious relationship between trading income and tail betas.
These possibilities can be checked by looking at the initial values of the ratio at the beginning of that six-year period rather than the average values over the six years. In Column 3 of Table 4 , all accounting variables are measured as initial values. Some interesting conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, trading income is still signi cant, which indicates that trading income causally affects bank risk. The other alternative revenue shares also remain signi cant. Second, return on equity has a lower impact. This indicates that part of the risk-return relationship is due to the higher pro ts that risky activities generate. The bank's average pro ts over that period will be higher, if a bank takes on more risk (as measured over a 6 year period). Nevertheless, the initial pro tability level is also signi cantly and positively related to a bank's extreme risk exposure. Finally, a bank's initial capital ratio signi cantly reduces banks' exposure to extreme systematic risk. The tail betas of nancially strong banks (at the beginning of the period) are less affected by a crash in the stock market return index.
The economic impact of revenue diversi cation on banking system stability Until now, we focussed the description of the results on the interpretation of the sign and the significance. To assess the magnitude of the coef cients and their economic impact we have to rely on tted marginal effects. Both the (logistic) link function and the level of the variables affect the estimated effect of a change in one variable on the tail-. That is:
In column 2 of Table 4 , we report the marginal effects of each variable when the expression in Equation (9) A bank that keeps its revenue shares unchanged, but would be faced with less correlated interest income and commission income, will observe a drop in its tail-. If this correlation drops from the sample mean (0:178) to that of the 5 th percentile ( :767), the tail beta will be almost 2 basis points lower. Hence, both the type of income and their correlation play an important role in increasing banking system stability.
Controlling for non-traditional banking activities, we discover that a larger capital buffer in nancial institutions will exert a mitigating effect on their extreme risk exposure. An increase of the equity-toassets ratio of 0:05 will result, all else equal, in a drop in the tail beta of almost 4:5 basis points. Bank size is by far the most important contributor to heterogeneity in tail risk. Consider two banks that only differ in size, one bank has the average size while the value of the total assets of the other bank is xed at the 75 th percentile. The difference in tail-exceeds 0:05. The larger bank will have, all else equal, a 5% higher probability of a large drop in its stock return occurring if there is a large, negative shock to the European market return index. This increase equals a substantial proportion of the average tail-.
Depending on the time period, an increase with 5 basis points corresponds to 30% of the average tail- (9)).
The middle panel provides a similar graph for the share of trading income and the lower panel contains information on the other operating income share. Column 2 of Table 4 shows the marginal impact of the non-traditional banking activities when they are evaluated at the sample mean. From Figure 1 
Support for the baseline equation
Many banks are not included in all subperiods. Hence, the panel data set is unbalanced. If (non-)selection in the sample occurs randomly, then the results of the baseline regression are not subject to a selection bias. Some sources of (dis)appearing in (from) the sample are potentially non-random and may affect the estimated relationships. Examples of non-random events that may bias the estimates are IPOs, delistings, M&As, or the elimination of infrequently traded bank stocks from the sample. In this subsection, we describe the analysis of this events. The estimation results are documented in Table 5 .
First, bank stocks that are traded infrequently are excluded since the risk measure will not be informative. Furthermore, some banks either entered the sample after an IPO or dropped out due to a delisting. These three events have in common that accounting data are available for the entire period but stock price information is not available or useful for the entire period 1992-2004. In column 1 of Table   5 , we present the results when all observations on such banks are discarded 13 . The sample size reduces to 618 observations. However, none of the results reported in Table 4 alters. The conclusions regarding the magnitude and signi cance of the impact of revenue shares and the correlation of their growth rates are still valid.
Another important source of unbalancedness are mergers and acquisitions. We check the stability 13 We can also estimate a Heckman (1976) selection model for these events. Given that we consider multiple selection events, we implement a two-step procedure. Initially, we estimate three different selection equations (probit regressions). The dummy is one if that bank-time observation is included in the nal sample and zero otherwise. Subsequently, we compute the Inverse Mills ratio (or selection hazard) for each selection equation and incorporate them in the baseline equation. We obtain that none of the Inverse Mills ratios is signi cant at the traditional signi cance levels. Accounting for non-randomness in the sample selection alters the marginal effects (slightly) but not the signi cance.
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of the results by leaving out the banks that are involved in an M&A. Column 2 of Table 5 contains the estimation results when both pre-M&A entities and post-M&A entities are excluded from the sample.
The results hardly change. If anything, the coef cients on the alternative revenue streams as well as the correlation coef cients become larger, which only strengthens the ndings of the baseline.
We also examine the aforementioned selection issues simultaneously. Column 3 contains the results for a substantially reduced sample (as a result of dropping banks that are involved in one or more of the selection criteria). In column 4, we report results for the initial sample size but include (not reported) dummy variables for the various potential sample selection problems. The results do not change qualitatively. However, in the smaller sample almost all coef cients are larger in absolute value. Regarding the dummy variables, we observe that banks whose shares are traded infrequently have lower tail betas.
These banks are typically smaller banks, which strengthens the ndings on bank size. Furthermore, banks that enter the sample after an IPO or drop due to a delisting have, as expected, a higher extreme systematic risk exposure. To conclude, although the panel dataset is unbalanced, the sources of the missing values in the dataset do not affect the relationships of interest.
Some European countries have been confronted with a banking crisis 14 in the beginning of the nineties. Especially for the Scandinavian countries, the crises in the banking industry were severe in terms of output loss as a percentage of GDP. Given the focus on heterogeneity in banks' extreme risk pro les, these unusual events may drive the results. In column 5 of Table 5 , we exclude a bank-time observation if this bank has been active in a country that experienced a banking crisis during one of the six years of that time frame. The results reported in Column 5 show that including the crisis periods does not affect the results. The coef cients on the alternative revenue shares and the correlation coef cients are of a similar magnitude as those reported in Table 4 , which further strengthens the stability of our ndings.
The baseline results are obtained for a sample of commercial banks and bank holding companies. However, since the purpose of this research is to investigate the impact of diversi cation strategies on banking stability we further imposed two restrictions on the sample used in the baseline. First, we eliminated non-diversi ed banks from the sample. That is, we only include banks with an interest income share between 10% and 90%. Banks not satisfying this criterion are categorized as too specialized. Furthermore, we also eliminate fast-growing banks. For these banks, the correlation between each pair of growth rates of the different revenue types may be biased and overstate the true degree of revenue correlation. Column 6 of Table 5 reports the results when we do include the fast growing banks. In the last column of Table 5 , we report the results for the full sample of commercial banks and bank holding companies. In this case, the sample size increases by 10% to 743 observations. All results established in Table 4 still hold. However, in the full sample the magnitude of the impact of the equity-to-asset ratio is substantially reduced (but still signi cant). In addition, we obtain that the Her ndahl Hirschmann index of the non-interest generating activities is negatively and signi cantly related to banks' tail-.
This unexpected result indicates that banks' risk pro le will be improved if they focus their non-interest income, but is predominantly caused by a few banks that derive more than 90% of their income from non-traditional banking activities (and should therefore be considered as outliers).
Tail dependence versus central dependence
We are interested in assessing the extent to which individual banks are exposed to a severe aggregate shock, as captured by an extreme downturn of the market risk factor. For that purpose, multivariate extreme value analysis is a well-suited technique since it accounts for the fat tails that are inherent to stock prices and it is not tied to speci c distributional assumptions. In general, most authors focus on systematic risk during normal conditions. Dependency in the center of the distribution is typically measured using a rm's beta or a correlation coef cient, which both describe the sensitivity of an asset's returns to broad market movements. While measures of dependence in the tails and the center are theoretically distinct concepts, they may share several features. For reasons of comparability with the tail-, we measure banks' normal systematic risk exposures over moving windows of 6 years. The rst period covers the years 1992-1997. In each subsequent subsample, we drop the observations of the initial sample year and add a more recent year of data. Next to calculating a bank's market beta, we also compute the squared correlation coef cient with the market returns. We analyze the information content of the dependence concepts and arrive at a number of interesting conclusions.
First, the rank correlation between the tail beta and the ordinary beta (or correlation coef cient) is very high. Across the eight time windows of six years, it uctuates in the range of 60% to 75%. Hence, banks with a large exposure to market movements in normal economic conditions will be strongly tied to extreme movements as well. The high correlation implies that both dependence measures share an important component. Second, we established signi cant relationships between non-traditional banking activities and banks' extreme systematic risk exposures (see Column 1 of Table 4 and 6). We run similar regressions, but substitute the dependent variable. The results are reported in Columns 2 of Table 6 . The tail beta is replaced as dependent variable by the squared correlation coef cient. We discover similar relationships. All non-interest generating activities increase the exposure of banks' stock returns tomarket movements. However, where the impact of the three non-interest generating activities on the tail beta is signi cantly different from zero, this is not the case for the share of operating income in normal conditions. Moreover, the impact of trading income is signi cantly larger than the impact of commission income and other operating income. Contrary to expectations, banks systematic risk will be higher the more equal the shares of interest and non-interest income are. The coef cient on HHI REV is negative and signi cant. Only for the two Her ndahl Hirschmann indices do we observe different signs in Therefore, we add the squared correlation coef cient to the baseline regression (Column 3 of Table   6 ). Doing so, we want to decompose the effect of bank-speci c variables on the tail betas into a direct effect and an indirect effect. The direct effects are the estimated relationships between a variable and the tail-beta. The indirect effect captures how a variable affects risk both in normal and extreme conditions and runs through the impact of the central dependence measure. Due to the large, positive correlation we expect and nd a highly signi cant relationship between the traditional dependence measure and the tail beta. Hence, an increase in, for instance, the share of commission or trading income will indirectly result in an increase of the tail beta. If any of the bank-speci c variables exhibit a signi cant 15 relationship with the tail beta, this implies that there is a direct effect that increases extreme bank risk in addition to the indirect effect.
When the central dependence measures are taken into account, we obtain that all non-traditional banking activities contribute positively to a bank's extreme risk pro le. However, only the share of commission and fee income in total income is signi cant at the conventional signi cance levels. Furthermore, a stronger correlation between shocks to other operating income and both other non-interest income sources increases banks' tail-. Measures of bank size and bank pro tability are signi cant 15 From Column 2 of Table 6 , we learn that many bank-speci c variables have a large partial correlation coef cient with the central dependence measure. This may create a multicollinearity problem and hence harms nding signi cant relationships by in ating the standard errors in Column 3 of Table 6 . Therefore, we focus more on the magnitude of the coef cient rather than the signi cance level.
and hence enforce the positive indirect effect. Fourth, in column 4 Table 6 , we report a joint effect 16 , which is the sum of the direct (coef cients in Column 3) and indirect effect (coef cient on the central dependence measure times the estimated coef cients in Column 2). It is interesting to compare the direct effects, the coef cients in Column 3, with the joint effects in Column 4. For instance, the direct effect of an increase in commission income or other operating income on a bank's extreme risk pro le is larger than the indirect effect. Concerning trading income, the direct effect is only one third as large as the overall effect. The impact of correlated shocks between interest income and any of the non-interest income activities works predominantly via the general, central risk measure. However, the opposite observation can be made for the correlation between pairs of non-interest generating activities.
To conclude, we discover a high correlation between banks' systematic risk exposures in normal and stress periods. Furthermore, the shift to non-traditional banking activities has increased banks' systematic risk and as a consequence their tail beta. However, there is also an additional and, for most variables, an even larger direct effect on banks' tail betas.
Conclusion
The banking sector occupies a central role in every economy and is a particularly important sector for the stability of nancial systems. As a result, central bankers and nancial supervisors invest many resources in analyzing and safeguarding banking sector stability. Reliable indicators of banking system stability are of utmost importance. In this paper, we employ a recent approach to assess banking system risk (Hartmann et al., 2006) . This statistical approach assesses the joint occurrence of very rare events, such as severe banking problems. More speci cally, the bank-speci c extreme systematic risk measure captures the probability of a sharp decline in a bank's stock price conditional on a crash in a market index. We discover considerable heterogeneity in banks' contributions to overall banking sector stability. This observation should not be surprising in light of some remarkable developments over the last decades. Substantial banking consolidation, the dismantling of the legal barriers to the integration of nancial services and technological evolution all affected the organizational design of banking rms.
These developments initiated the emergence of large and complex banking organizations. However, some banks remain specialized in traditional intermediation activities or target local customers.
When relating the co-crash probabilities to bank-speci c accounting variables we can explain a fair amount of the cross-sectional dispersion in extreme bank risk. We establish that the shift to non- 16 The joint effects are, as expected, similar in magnitude to the coef cients reported in Column 1.
traditional banking activities increases banks' co-crash probabilities and thus reduces banking system stability. Interest income is less risky than all other revenue streams. However, the impact of the alternative revenue shares (commission and fee income, trading income, other operating income) does not differ substantially from one another. Other indicators of bank specialization in traditional intermediation, such as the net interest margin and the loans-to-assets ratio corroborate the nding that traditional banking activities are less risky. Hence, we can conclude that banks that pro tably focus on lending activities are less prone to extreme systematic risk than diversi ed banks. This questions the usefulness of nancial conglomeration as a risk diversi cation device, at least in times of stock market turmoil. Retail banks, with a relatively high proportion of core deposits and loans in total assets, have a consistently lower extreme systematic risk. Furthermore, bank size is by far the most signi cant driver of banks' tail betas. Larger banks are exposed to many sectors in many countries and are hence more tied to European wide shocks. A larger capital buffer decreases a bank's exposure to extreme market shocks. This nding is expected and underlines the importance of capital adequacy as a signal of bank creditworthiness.
The established relationships bear implications for bank supervision. Since the large banks are more exposed to European-wide shocks and economic conditions, their prudential supervision needs to take that feature into account. In Europe, increasing banking sector integration initiated by directives that led to the single market for nancial services further complicated the tasks of national and supranational
supervisors. This will be even more the case when banks further increase their cross-border activities.
For the locally operating banks, supervision at the country level should suf ce to assess the implications of their risk pro le. In addition, the results are interesting in light of the third pillar of the Basel II.
Market participants, rather than armies of regulators, will do some of the work in assessing the overall risk position of the bank. A more complete and coherent disclosure of the different revenue streams facilitates a better understanding of the risks being taken by different institutions. In European banking, steps need to be taken in order to get a more detailed and consistent picture of the underlying components of non-interest revenue components, especially with respect to commission and fee income. The US reporting requirements, which include a 12-item distinction of non-interest income (since March 2001) may be a useful benchmark. Panel A provides the results for the European stock market index. Panels B and C report the time evolution as well as the cross-sectional heterogeneity across the set of listed European banks. The unconditional VaR is measured using univariate extreme value analysis. The crash magnitude or VaR corresponds with an event that occurs with a probability of 0.04%. Panel C presents the expected shortfall that corresponds with an event that occurs with a probability of 0.04%. Note: this table contains information on the tail-betas or co-crash probabilities for the set of listed European banks. The tail-betas are obtained using the Ledford and Tawn approach (1996) . The table reports the time evolution as well as the cross-sectional heterogeneity across the set of listed European banks. The numbers are in percentages. The crashes occur with a probability of 0.04%. Standard errors in brackets (clustered at country level) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Note: The first column reports the results for the baseline regression. In this regression, the dependent variable, the tail-β, provides an indication of extreme systematic risk over a period of six year. The co-crash probability is bound between [0,1]. Therefore, we employ a generalized linear model, estimated using quasi-maximum likelihood. The independent variables are averages over a six year interval to match the time interval over which the dependent variable is estimated. We apply robust regression techniques to mitigate the effect of outliers in the dataset. In each regression, we include time dummies as well as country fixed effects. Standard errors take into account groupwise heteroscedasticity. The second column contains the marginal effects of the coefficients in the first column. The marginal effects are evaluated at the sample mean of the ratios. The third reports results for variations on the benchmark equation. If a coefficient is reported in a grey box, this means that this ratio is measured as the initial value at the beginning of that period. Standard errors in brackets (clustered at country level) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: The table presents information on the stability of the baseline results in various subsamples. In Column 1, we eliminate the banks whose shares have been illiquid in previous sample periods, banks that go public and banks that are delisted. In Column 2, we check whether M&As that occurred during the sample period affect the results. We estimate the baseline regressions respectively without the banks that constitute the separate entities before the M&A and without the resulting new entity after the M&A. In column 3, we redo the analysis and include only those banks that were not involved in one of the aforementioned events. In column 4, we use the baseline sample but include (not reported) dummies for each of the aforementioned events. In Column 5, we exclude a bank-time observation if the banking industry in the associated country experienced a banking crisis in one of the 6 years of that timeframe. In the last two columns, we extend the sample and include respectively fast-growing banks and specialized banks (banks with a share of non-interest income larger than 90%). In the regressions, the dependent variable, the tail-β, provides an indication of extreme systematic risk over a period of six year. The co-crash probability is bound between [0,1]. Therefore, we employ a generalized linear model, estimated using quasi-maximum likelihood. The independent variables are averages over a six year interval to match the time interval over which the dependent variable is estimated. We apply robust regression techniques to mitigate the effect of outliers in the dataset. In each regression, we include time dummies as well as country fixed effects. Standard errors take into account groupwise heteroscedasticity. . Standard errors in brackets (clustered at country level) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: The table presents information on the differential impact of various bank characteristics on the tail beta and more traditional measures that capture dependency in normal times. The first column reports the results for the baseline regression. In this regression, the dependent variable, the tail-β, provides an indication of extreme systematic risk over a period of six year. The co-crash probability is bound between [0,1]. Therefore, we employ a generalized linear model, estimated using quasi-maximum likelihood. The independent variables are averages over a six year interval to match the time interval over which the dependent variable is estimated. We apply robust regression techniques to mitigate the effect of outliers in the dataset. In each regression, we include time dummies as well as country fixed effects. Standard errors take into account groupwise heteroscedasticity. Columns 2 to 4 report information when the squared correlation coefficient is used to measure the normal dependence between bank stock returns and the returns on a European index. Column 2 reports the results for the drivers of the squared correlation coefficient. In column 3, this squared correlation coefficient is added to the baseline regression. In column 4, we report the joint effects. The joint effect of a bank characteristic is the sum of a direct effect on banks' tail beta and an indirect effect via the traditional dependence measure. Note: This chart presents information on the marginal impact of a change in the share of a non-interest revenue source. Each chart contains plots with the marginal effect of a change in the share of a non-interest income source over the range of observed values of that variable. All but one of the other independent variables are fixed at their sample mean. In addition, one other independent variable is not evaluated at its sample mean. In the left hand side graphs, the equity-to-asset ratio can take on different values, whereas bank size varies in the right hand side graphs. The solid, blue line corresponds to the case where bank capital (bank size) is evaluated at the value corresponding with its 75 th percentile (rather than the mean). If bank capital (or bank size) is set at the value of the 25 th percentile, the marginal effects are represented by the dotted, green line. The top panel represents the marginal effect of a change in the share of commission income over the range of observed values of that variable. The values on the X-axis represent the share of commission income, while the values at the Y-axis indicate the marginal effect. The middle panel provides a similar graph for the share of trading income and the lower panel contains information on the other operating income share. The marginal effects should be interpreted as the extent to which the co-crash probability will increase if one unit of the share of interest income is transferred to one of the three alternative revenue shares. In each panel, two lines are plotted.
